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TRANSACTIONAL SKILLS TRAINING:   
CONTRACT DRAFTING—BEYOND THE BASICS 
SCOTT J. BURNHAM* 
My topic is ambiguity.  Let me put this in context.  One thing that can’t be 
said enough is that when we talk about a transactional approach, what we are really 
talking about is the practice of preventive law. We are the ones preventing the 
problems from arising. Ambiguity is really an aspect of interpretation, and 
interpretation is actually the number one litigated issue in contracts. So by preventing 
ambiguity, what you are doing is preventing litigation from arising over the meaning 
of contract terms.  By the way, it is worth pointing out that the incentives are all 
wrong—the heroes in the legal world are the litigators who win the big case for the 
client.  But the real unsung hero is that person in the back room who, with a couple 
of little key strokes or by changing one word in the transaction prevented the 
problem from arising in the first place.  Unfortunately, we don’t get to reward that 
person as often we should.  So I hope you will provide those incentives and try to 
reward that individual. 
 I am going to give you a few examples of ambiguity and how to cure it.  But 
of course the real problem is to spot it.  Ambiguity means there are at least two 
possible meanings and, to solve the problem, you have to recognize it.  So can you 
see that there are two different meanings?  
                                                            
* Scott J. Burnham is a Professor of Law at The University of Montana School of Law Professor 
Burnham teaches Contracts, Commercial and Consumer Law, and Copyright Law. He teaches from 
the perspective of a practicing attorney, emphasizing preventive law rather than litigation.  Before he 
began his teaching career at The University of Montana, he practiced in New York City from 1975-
1981. Professor Burnham has been a visiting professor at the law schools at Santa Clara University, 
the University of Tennessee, Western New England College, the University of Nevada, Las Vegas, 
Hawaii, Cardozo, and Vytautas Magnus in Lithuania. As a Fulbright Senior Specialist, he has taught at 
the University of Montevideo in Uruguay and Can Tho University in Vietnam.  Professor Burnham is 
a member of the American Law Institute (ALI).  He received his J.D. and LL.M. degrees from New 
York University in 1974 and 1981 respectively. 
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 This is a graphic illustration of this idea.  While some people looking at this 
image see the old crone, others see the beautiful young woman.  The question is, can 
you train yourself to see both?  One of the skills you are working at when solving 
problems in ambiguity is critical reading.  You are talking back to your draft.  You 
are not reading passively, but actively trying to find those available meanings. It can 
also be a collaborative process—it can be helpful to have another set of eyes look at 
the document.  Don’t try to do it yourself, but have someone else read it and look at 
it.  This can be helpful in solving the problem. 
 By the way, I looked into this from the malpractice point of view and found 
that the fact that a court interprets language against the lawyer is probably not 
malpractice.1  One of the reasons courts say it is not malpractice is because anybody 
can spot an ambiguity.  You don’t have to be a lawyer. So the tip you can give to 
your students who are going to be lawyers is:  always give a copy of the draft to your 
client to read and it is up to them to spot the ambiguities.  The responsibility will not 
fall entirely on the lawyer.  But, of course, we don’t want to just avoid malpractice; 
we want to prevent these problems from arising. I love this warning from David 
Mellinkoff about drafting.  That is a bit of a Freudian slip on my part, for the book is 
                                                            
1  See, e.g., Sutton v. Mytich, 555 N.E.2d 93 (1990). 
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actually called Legal Writing:  Sense and Nonsense.2  Mellinkoff was sort of perverse; he 
thought there was no such thing as drafting and that it is all merely writing.  But I think 
he didn’t give allowance to the fact that in law school drafting is something different 
from writing.  Anyway, he says, “Some day some one will read what you have 
written, trying to find something wrong with it. This is the special burden of legal 
writing, and the special incentive to be as precise as you can.”3  So that’s the warning 
to your students—to take care when they are writing. 
 On to some examples of ambiguity that you can use with students.  One, of 
course, is that the word might have a different meaning in the trade than it has in the 
ordinary usage.  Some of us teaching Contracts use a case where there was a horse 
that was available for breeding for the year 1966, and the issue was whether not 
making the horse available for breeding until July was a breach of contract.4  Both 
parties acknowledged that July was too late, and the judge said, wait a minute, the 
contract says, “for the year 1966,” but it was clear to the parties that “the year 1966” 
meant the breeding year, not the calendar year. So that word had two meanings, one 
in the trade and one in ordinary usage.   
 By the way, in Montana they call me Mr. Contracts, because I am the only 
contracts professor in the only law school in the state.  I mention this because even 
Mr. Contracts can get trapped by ambiguity problems. I drafted this contract for an 
artist client—he was a sculptor—between him and the foundry, and we said the 
foundry was going to cast panels for him at a price of $100 per square foot.  He sent 
a panel to the foundry that was two feet by five feet, and they sent a bill for $1,500.  I 
said, “wait a minute this is 10 square feet,” and they said, “no, it is 15 square feet.”  
We were thinking of the dimensions of the panel, and they were thinking of the 
surface area because it was three dimensional.  They had 15 square feet of surface 
area that they were coating.  So square foot meant something different to them than it 
meant to me, and I had to admit that their interpretation was probably better than 
mine.  The lesson is to make sure that you understand the transaction in the context 
of the trade or business. 
 Students are very quick to say, “Oh this language is vague and ambiguous.”  
Well, make sure you explain to them the difference between vagueness and 
ambiguity—that ambiguity is often opposite meanings, for example, black and white, 
whereas vagueness is a range of possibilities and usually within a fairly narrow range.  
                                                            
2 DAVID MELLINKOFF, LEGAL WRITING:  SENSE AND NONSENSE (1983). 
3 Id. at 15. 
4 Taylor v. Johnston, 539 P.2d 425 (Cal. 1975). 
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Those of you who teach Article 2 of the UCC have grown to love these vague terms 
like prompt and reasonable and good faith.  Those are wonderful terms as far as I am 
concerned, and they are not to be avoided.  So you can argue about whether prompt 
means ten days or twenty days; that’s vague, but it’s not ambiguous.  So there is 
nothing wrong with being intentionally vague; you can decide whether you want 
shipment in ten days or you want prompt shipment.  But you don’t want to be 
intentionally or unintentionally ambiguous. 
 Here is another example of ambiguity; this is the so-called “golden rule of 
drafting.”  I once asked my students what is the “golden rule of drafting,” and 
somebody finally said, “Draft unto others as you would have them draft unto you.”  
I thought that was pretty good.  
 But the real golden rule of drafting is:  “Never change your language unless 
you wish to change your meaning, and always change your language if you wish to 
change your meaning.”5  Here is an example of this idea. This shareholder agreement 
starts off by talking about “sell, transfer, assign, pledge, encumber or otherwise 
dispose of or convey” and then later in the agreement it talks merely about 
“transfer:”  
• “Except to the extent expressly permitted by this Agreement, 
Shareholders may not sell, transfer, assign, pledge, encumber or 
otherwise dispose of or convey (by operation of law or otherwise) 
shares of the Corporation.” 
• “If a shareholder proposes to transfer shares and dies prior to the 
closing of the sale and purchase contemplated by Section 1 . . . .” 
What happened to all those other forms of disposal?  If you are going to use all of 
those methods the first time, you want to use them all the second time. And of 
course the best solution to this problem would be to have a definition that would 
define all of those forms of transfer as “transfer” and then use “transfer” from then 
on.  The computer can be useful here to search for subsequent uses.  We could 
search for sell, search for transfer, search for assign, and so forth throughout the 
agreement to see that the same language is used throughout.  Now definitions are 
also a good way to avoid ambiguity.  We of course all remember the chicken case,6 
where one party thought chicken meant broiler and the other party thought chicken 
meant stewer.  Wouldn’t the parties have been sensible just to define what they meant 
by chicken?  A good way to avoid ambiguity is to make sure your definitions work.  
                                                            
5 Scott J. Burnham, Drafting and Analyzing Contracts 227 (2003). 
6 Frigaliment Importing Co. v. B.N.S. Int’l Sales Corp., 190 F. Supp. 116 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). 
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One way to do this is to use the “find and replace” function of your word processor.  
Every time you find the defined term, replace it with the definition, and then read it 
to see if it works.  You don’t have to save the changes—this is just a technique for 
document checking. 
 I have an example from my practice that came up where the husband was 
supposed to pay base alimony of a $100 a week, and then in each subsequent 
calendar year, he was going to pay the base alimony plus the cost of living increase:  
• Cost of living increase.  “Base alimony” is defined as $100 per week.  In 
the first calendar year, Husband shall pay Wife the base alimony.  In 
each subsequent calendar year, Husband shall pay Wife the base 
alimony plus a cost of living increase.  The cost of living increase is 
the base alimony multiplied by the inflation rate for the prior year as 
determined by the Department of Labor. 
For example, assume in the first year he would pay $100 a week, and the second year 
he would pay the base alimony plus the cost of living.  Let’s say it went up 10 
percent, he would then pay $110 the second year. Well, assume it went up 10 percent 
in the third year. According to the formula he would pay the base alimony plus 10 
percent, so he paid $110 the third year:  
• Cost of living increase.  “Base alimony” is defined as $100 per week.  In 
the first calendar year, Husband shall pay Wife [$100 per week].  In 
each subsequent calendar year, Husband shall pay Wife [$100 per 
week] plus a cost of living increase.  The cost of living increase is 
[$100 per week] multiplied by the inflation rate for the prior year as 
determined by the Department of Labor. 
So the third year he pays $110, the wife says that’s not right, and he says, ha-ha that’s 
what it says in the contract. By the way, this is not really ambiguity because he is 
absolutely right that the language allows for only that one meaning, but of course the 
issue is, what did the parties intend to say?  I told him he was going to lose, that a 
court was not going to interpret this as it was written, and I ended up being right.  So 
then he said, “Well you didn’t really have your heart in that when you litigated it.”  
The takeaway from all this is:  rewrite the definition or the defined term when it is 
used inappropriately.  
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 Let’s now look at and and or. There is a whole chapter in my book on the use 
of and versus or, which lends itself to a lot of problems in ambiguity.7  Here is a great 
example.  This is from the Montana Lemon Law, so this is a statutory problem. It 
says the problem with the vehicle must affect the “use and market value or safety of 
the motor vehicle.”8  This is a great ambiguity: “affect the use and market value or 
safety.”  Does it have to affect the use and market value or the safety, or does it have 
to affect the use and the market value or safety?  See, it’s a perfect ambiguity because 
either interpretation is valid. And once you see these problems, they are fairly easy to 
cure.  I am a big fan of tabulation as a cure; we will look at that in a second. 
 Now, on to misplaced modifiers.  “Seller shall ship oranges and grapefruit 
from Florida.”  Obviously the grapefruit has to come from Florida, but what about 
the oranges?  Or “the employee shall receive severance benefits on termination of 
her employment by the company.”  She quit, and she asked for severance benefits, 
and the company said, “Ha-ha, you only get severance benefits on termination by the 
company.”  She said “No, I get severance benefits on termination of my 
employment by the company.  And my employment by the company was terminated 
by me. Therefore I get severance benefits.” The issue is, what does “by the 
company” modify:  termination or employment?  The bad news for the company is 
that many courts resolve ambiguities like this by using the rule of contra proferentem.  I 
tell students that translates as “screw the insurance company,” but it really means 
construe it against the drafter, for they are the one who caused the ambiguity to arise. 
 The next one is an example of a case litigated in Texas.9  The statute 
provided: 
• No person shall be eligible to serve [on the] Supreme Court unless 
the person is licensed to practice law in this state and is, at the time 
of election, a citizen of the United States and of this state, and has 
attained the age of thirty-five years, and has been a practicing lawyer 
. . . at least ten years. 
The person involved was elected and at the time of the election had not been a 
practicing lawyer for ten years, but would qualify at the time that he would have 
begun service. What does “at the time of election” modify?  This tabulation makes 
clear that “at the time of election” modifies all of the items that follow it: 
                                                            
7 Scott J. Burnham, Drafting and Analyzing Contracts Ch. 7 (2003). 
8 Mont. Code Ann. § 61-4-503 (2007). 
9 Sears v. Bayoud, 786 S.W.2d 248 (Tex. 1990). 
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• No person shall be eligible to serve on the Supreme Court unless the 
person is licensed to practice law in this state and, at the time of 
election:  
– is a citizen of the United States and of this state;  
– has attained the age of 35 years; and  
– has been a practicing lawyer for at least 10 years. 
Moving the modifier to the second tabulated item makes clear that “at the time of 
election” modifies only that item. 
• No person shall be eligible to serve on the Supreme Court unless the 
person: 
– is licensed to practice law in this state;  
– is, at the time of election, a citizen of the United States and of 
this state;  
– has attained the age of 35 years; and  
– has been a practicing lawyer for at least 10 years. 
Here is another example, from secured transactions.10  
• Debtor grants creditor a security interest in all inventory,  including 
but not limited to agricultural chemicals, fertilizers, and fertilizer 
materials sold to Debtor by Van Diest Supply Co. whether now 
owned or after acquired …. 
The security interest was granted in inventory, but the issue was whether “sold to 
debtor by Van Diest Supply Co” modifies just the fertilizer and the fertilizer 
materials or whether it modifies all inventory. In other words, did the debtor grant a 
security interest in all inventory or just in the inventory sold to debtor by Van Diest? 
 Once you spot this problem, you can fairly easily solve it by moving the 
modifier closer to the term it is going to modify. One solution, indicating that it 
modifies only the second phrase, might be: 
                                                            
10 Shelby County State Bank v. Van Diest Supply Co, 303 F.3d 832 (7th Cir. 2002). 
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• Debtor grants creditor a security interest in all inventory (including 
but not limited to agricultural chemicals, fertilizers, and fertilizer 
materials sold to Debtor by Van Diest Supply Co.), whether now 
owned or hereafter acquired. 
The other, indicating that it modifies the first, might be: 
• Debtor grants creditor a security interest in all inventory sold to 
Debtor by Van Diest Supply Co., including but not limited to 
agricultural chemicals, fertilizers, and fertilizer materials, whether now 
owned or hereafter acquired. 
So you can solve this problem once you spot it.  
 Another ambiguity problem arises when it is unclear whether you are talking 
about two classes or two characteristics of one class.  This example comes from a 
litigated case involving a statute that said, “No person shall make telephone calls that 
are threatening and obscene.”  Well the guy involved was prosecuted for violating 
this statute, and he said, “I admit that the phone call I made was obscene, but it 
wasn’t threatening.  Therefore, I didn’t make a call that was ‘threatening and 
obscene.’”  The court had no trouble saying that what the statute was really saying 
was that it prohibited two classes of phone calls.  It was saying no person shall make 
telephone calls that are threatening, and no person shall make telephone calls that are 
obscene.  There are other ways to solve the problem, too, again:  once you spot it. 
Two classes or two characteristics of one class? 
• Ask whether the and is joining what could be part of two sentences, or is 
connecting two parts of a sentence. 
• Rewrite for clarity or tabulate. 
 Punctuation can occasionally be a problem. In a case from Canada, the 
agreement provided:  “The agreement shall continue in force for a period of five 
years from the date it is made, and thereafter for successive five year terms, unless 
and until terminated by one year prior notice in writing by either party.” So what 
does the phrase “unless and until terminated by one year prior notice” modify?  One 
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party thought that they could terminate the agreement on one year’s notice. The 
other party thought they could do that after the first five years.11 
Compare: 
• The agreement shall continue in force for a period of five years from 
the date it is made, and thereafter for successive five year terms, 
unless and until terminated by one year prior notice in writing by 
either party. 
• The agreement shall continue in force for a period of five years from 
the date it is made, and thereafter for successive five year terms 
unless and until terminated by one year prior notice in writing by 
either party. 
The comma makes a big difference.  I think the second example without the comma 
makes it clear that there is going to be a five year term without any early termination.  
 I think one of the most important instances of ambiguity arises when you 
discuss the difference between promises and conditions.  In legislative drafting, must 
generally creates a condition.  You will see in statutes language like “to obtain a 
driver’s license a person must pass the road test.” But in contract drafting my advice 
is not to use must to create conditions. You don’t want to say things like “buyer must 
submit notice of defects within 30 days of receipt.” Probably the drafter here was 
intending to say, “if you don’t submit notice of defects within 30 days, then it is too 
late to give notice.” In other words, it’s a condition.  But courts don’t like conditions 
because the remedy for breach of a promise is damages while the remedy for failure 
of the condition is that the performance by the other party isn’t due. So to prevent 
the hardship caused by a condition, a court will say, “you were making a promise 
here, and what you were really saying was, ‘buyer shall submit notice of defects within 
30 days.’ Therefore, if that wasn’t done, the seller is entitled to damages but still has 
to perform.” So if you want to create a condition you have to spell it out—“buyer 
must submit notice of defects within 30 days” becomes “if buyer does not submit 
notice of defects within 30 days, then seller has no obligation.” Once you realize that 
you can spell it out as an express condition, what you have is a condition without the 
necessity of a promise. 
So, write on! (without ambiguity). 
                                                            
11 Can. Radio-Television & Telecomm. Comm’n [CRTC] 2006-45 (July 28, 2006) (Can.), available at 
http://www.crtc.gc.ca/eng/archive/2006/dt2006-45.htm. 
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LARRY A. DIMATTEO* 
CONTRACTS AND PRECEDENTS 
 I don’t know how “beyond the basics” my presentation is beyond the 
presentations earlier.  But I will go into more detail.  Drafting through precedents 
involves the use of existing sources in the drafting process, including case and 
statutory law, and standard and model forms and templates.  
 Karl Llewellyn saw contract writings as an art form.  In his famous book, The 
Bramble Bush,12 written to law students, he states:  “Drafting:  I know no art more 
difficult.”  I think in listening to Scott Burnham and others we can see that unless 
you are very motivated and very concentrated and give it a concentrated effort, it is 
easy not to be a great drafter.  Like Hercules in Dworkin’s theory of the common 
law and the legal order, to be a master of contract writing you need to be a drafting 
super human; you must live in a perfect world in which you have complete 
knowledge of general business custom, a specific knowledge of trade usage and the 
client’s business, a profound knowledge of every aspect of the law, superior writing 
skills, and be a master of utilitarian analysis.13  You need to excel in both the world of 
academics and the world of practice.   
 But in the “real world,” where we are teaching law students how to create 
real world documents, we have time constraints, knowledge of law is less than 
perfect, and, of course, law is less than perfect.  Even if we have a hypothetical 
perfect drafter, the law is imperfect in that it is constantly changing.  Therefore, we 
have to continuously refresh ourselves in our drafting skills and in the substance of 
the law. The problem is that unlimited legal fees are not an option. The time 
allocated to drafting will vary between the size of the deal and the size of the client, 
but beware, if you want to put less time into something—for example for a smaller 
client—of course you still have the issues of not doing a good job and malpractice.  
That said the other real world complication in drafting is the other side might 
actually want some input.  This is what I always found disturbing in practice! 
                                                            
* Larry A. DiMatteo is the Huber Hurst Professor of Contract Law and Legal Studies at the 
Warrington College of Business, University of Florida. Professor DiMatteo received his J.D. from the 
Cornell Law School, LL.M. from Harvard Law School and Ph.D. from Monash University (Australia). 
He is the former Chair of the Department of Management at the University of Florida and past 
Editor in Chief of the American Business Law Journal. 
12 KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH:  ON OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY (1930). 
13 See Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1057 (1975); Ronald Dworkin, Law as 
Interpretation, 60 TEXAS L. REV. 527 (1981). 
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I.  WHAT KIND OF DRAFTING? 
This Part examines the two main drafting methodologies:  precedent-based 
drafting and zero-based drafting.  Precedent-based drafting refers to the use of 
materials external to the transaction.  These external sources include standard, 
previously-used, and model contracts or forms.  Zero-based drafting is the creation 
of contract clauses from the particulars of the transaction, statutes, and the case law. 
A.  Precedent-Based Drafting 
 So what types or techniques of drafting should we use?  Clearly we live in a 
world of precedent-based drafting:  using some sort of standard form or intra-firm 
generated materials, such as contracts used in prior dealings or through some basic 
research finding form contracts used in specific trades or by use of the Internet. On 
the positive side, the use of form or model contract forms is cost effective, and a 
standard form may be industry accepted.  So in real estate, there is a standard real 
estate contract that is prepared by the local realtor board, maybe in association with 
the local or state bar association, and generally you are going to be able to adequately 
serve your client if you use such a form.  Real estate model contracts will generally 
take in account both the buyer’s and seller’s interests.   
Standard or model forms are often used as templates.  Suppose that you are 
in a medium or large sized firm.  No transactions are ever going to be identical.  
Although, they might be, as Karl Llewellyn would say, “of the same situation or 
transaction-type.”14 Examples of different transaction types include sales, franchise, 
lease, asset-based financing, such as secured transactions and mortgage lending 
contracts.  But the form or prior agreement is only helpful to a certain point, because 
the deals in a given transaction-type could be in many ways completely different. On 
the negative side, the precedent document is only as good as the initial drafter, may 
be dated, and may favor the wrong party.  George Kuney stated yesterday that the 
drafter needs to use a form that is a pro-client form or a prior agreement written on 
behalf of the client in a deal in which the client possessed superior bargaining 
power.15 
 Most firms, large and small, have represented clients on both sides of a 
transaction (lender-borrower, landlord-tenant, buyer-seller, assignor-assignee) and 
                                                            
14 KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 268-271 (1960). 
15 See supra George W. Kuney & Tina L. Stark, Transactional Skills Training:  Contract Drafting—The 
Basics. 
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have developed forms or model contracts over time.  Tina Stark warns that the 
drafter should start, not with the finished product in using an existing contract or 
template, but with the initial draft of the template or prior agreement—that way you 
can see the changes made during the drafting of the previous document and 
determine the reason for the changes.16  Such a study of the evolution of a contract 
will unveil the issues that the drafter faced in writing the contract.  This will help 
guide the current drafter in modifying the contract to reflect the specific facts of the 
current transaction. 
B.  Zero-Based Drafting 
 Zero-based or customized drafting directs the drafter to the law in an area 
(cases, statutes, and regulations) in writing the contract. I don’t think that’s really 
done enough anymore—but clearly it can be done and should be done for certain 
types of clauses. I have selected the covenant not-to-compete (see Part III) as one 
that provides a perfect example as to not using any sort of form possessing a 
boilerplate covenant not-to-compete without independent analysis and 
customization.  This allows the drafter to update the contract for changes in the law 
and, if we are playing to the judge, using state law to “guide” the court in its review 
of these types of highly scrutinized clauses. The issues in clauses, such as covenants 
not-to-compete, anti-assignment, and liquidated damages (see list below), are the 
things we learn in first-year contracts. These types of clauses are highly scrutinized 
because of public policy concerns and therefore use of state law (statutes and cases) 
is necessary in drafting an enforceable clause.  The cons to this sort of drafting is that 
it is not particularly cost effective, so the ultimate solution is that you want to use a 
template but then customize at least some of the clauses that are really the operative 
ones and the ones that are most scrutinized by the courts.  The following is a list of 
some of the most highly scrutinized clauses in contracts: 
 
 
                                                            
16 TINA L. STARK, DRAFTING CONTRACTS:  HOW AND WHY LAWYERS DO WHAT THEY DO (2007). 
• Quality Term 
• Force Majeure 
• Confidentiality Clause 
• Anti-Assignment Clause 
• Indemnification 
• Choice of Law/Forum Clause 
• Arbitration Clause 
• Exculpatory Clause 
• Liquidated Damage Clause 
• Time is of the Essence Clause 
• Renewal Clause 
• Covenant not to Compete 
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II.  HOW TO CHOOSE THE RIGHT PRECEDENT DOCUMENT 
I went to work for a large law firm fresh out of law school and my first 
assignment was writing a commercial lease.  The partner gave me a four-inch thick 
digest of alternative commercial lease terms.  It was an old, yellowed text.  It 
consisted of a rotisserie of one-sided to less one-side clauses. There were, for 
example, 11 different versions of a particular term going from pro-landlord to pro-
lessee.  And, without any guidance, I just willy-nilly picked one of the more moderate 
versions thinking:  “Okay, we don’t want to get too obnoxious here.”  It was really 
the fault of the senior lawyer in not giving me any context—what type of client, what 
type of deal—there was none of that.  Now, I don’t know if it was just a training 
exercise.  I just hope to God the partner never used it.  Instead of the rotisserie 
method, it is more efficient and likely to produce a higher quality outcome, to use an 
intra-firm contract from a similar transaction, and then focus on the uniqueness of 
your transaction (even though it’s the same transaction-type) and work from there. 
 So how do we choose the precedent document?  The Internet makes it easy 
to find a form, depending on whether the industry is a structured or an unstructured 
industry; whether the transaction is more of a local, state, national, or an 
international transaction; and depending on whether it is a single-party or a two-party 
constituency (for example, model forms are often used by both sellers and buyers in 
a given industry or transaction-type).  The real estate contract, used in an ordinary 
purchase and sale of a home, is a model form where both parties sign the bottom 
and that is it, that is the contract.  In the sale of goods transaction, contracting 
parties use various forms as offers and acceptances, such as purchase orders, written 
confirmations, price quotations, and pro-forma invoices.  The exchange of these 
often one-sided forms creates the “battle of the form” scenario addressed by UCC 
Section 2-207.  Scholars and judges have not been able to agree on a uniform 
application of Section 2-207 in any realistic way. So if you have a form that is 
industry accepted and both parties are familiar with it, clearly you are starting off 
closer to the end state than you would if you are starting from scratch.  Many forms 
are available through the local bar, state bar, private form companies at the state 
level, CLE, and “within” state statutes.   
A.  Using State Statutes When Creating Precedent-Based Forms 
 In some states, statutes provide the parameters of enforceability for certain 
types of contracts.  New York Real Property Law has relatively detailed provisions 
governing residential leases.  For example, it provides a boilerplate term for security 
deposit clauses.  
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B.  Use of Model Form Contracts 
In drafting international contracts, the International Chamber of Commerce 
(ICC) produces excellent, party-neutral model form agreements and contract term 
manuals (such as, a force majeure clause manual). These types of organization or 
industry-generated model contracts are especially helpful because foreign agency and 
employment laws vary among countries.  The current list of ICC model contracts 
and clauses include: 
• Model Commercial Agency Contract 
• Model Confidentiality Agreement 
• Model International Franchising Contract 
• Model Distribution Contract 
• Model Contract for Turnkey Supply of an Industrial Plant 
• Model Mergers and Acquisitions Contract 
• Model Occasional Intermediary Contract 
• Model Sales Contract 
• Model Clauses on Electronic Contracting 
• Handbook for Global Sourcing 
• Force Majeure Clause 
The ICC continues to produce model forms including a new Model Trademark 
License, Model Technology Transfer Contract, and Model Subcontracting 
Contract.17 
                                                            
17 The ICC provides this description of its model contracts:   
The Commission on Commercial Law and Practice (CLP) develops ICC model 
contracts and ICC model clauses which give parties a neutral framework for their 
contractual relationships. These contracts and clauses are carefully drafted by experts 
of the CLP Commission without expressing a bias for any one particular legal system.  
The idea behind ICC model contracts and clauses is to provide a sound legal basis 
upon which parties to international contracts can quickly establish an even-handed 
agreement acceptable to both sides.  The contracts are the products of some of the 
finest legal minds in the field of international commercial law. They are constructed to 
protect the interests of all the parties, combining a single framework of rules with 
flexible provisions allowing the parties to insert their own requirements. 
International Chamber of Commerce, “Model Contracts and Clauses,” available at 
http://www.iccwbo.org/policy/law/id272/index.html.  
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C.  “Twelve Tips” in Selecting & Using Standard and Model Forms 
An important asset in building quality model clauses and contracts that may 
be useable with customization in future contract drafting is the contract or contract 
clause checklist.  The checklist may consist of previously used contract language and 
transaction-specific facts and issues.  Mostly, a checklist should provide a series of 
questions to be answered by the drafting attorney.  The following list of twelve tips 
provides a checklist for selecting and using forms in general.  Part III will discuss 
how a checklist can be developed for specific clauses.  It will examine the issues 
relevant to drafting a covenant not-to-compete. 
1. Find state-specific forms. 
2. Find industry-specific forms. 
3. Find annotated forms. 
4. Revise for style. 
5. Update forms for substance & law. 
6. Take into account deal-specific issues. 
7. Ask client meaning of unfamiliar terms (business or trade usage). 
8. Always ask:  What provisions should be added? 
9. Compare forms from different sources. 
10. Compare different drafts of internally-generated forms (from first to final 
drafts). 
11. Never change your language within a form unless you wish to change its 
meaning throughout. 
12. Always consider the source.  
The best form books are state and industry specific.  This is based on the 
simple fact that what is legal and what is considered appropriate varies from state to 
state and industry to industry.  Annotated forms provide the best protection against 
using a form based upon the law of an inapplicable state or on outdated law.  Even 
annotated and recently updated forms will lag behind recent changes in state law.  
For example, in late 2008, the Governor of New York signed into law the 
“Broadcast Employees Freedom to Work Act” to provide that certain non-compete 
agreements involving broadcast employees are void and unenforceable.18  This is 
                                                            
18 Assembly Bill 2124; Senate Bill 2393.  See Governor Press Release (August 8, 2008), available at 
http://www.ny.gov/governor/press/index.html. 
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from a state that has generally deferred to the courts in determining the 
enforceability of covenants not-to-compete.    
The drafting attorney should review all forms along three parameters:  (1) as 
noted above, the attorney must research any recent changes in state law.  This is 
especially true for contracts and clauses that have been highly scrutinized by the 
courts in the past. (2) A form should be reviewed not only for substantive 
correctness, but also for clarity and style. (3)  Review the form’s language to take into 
account deal specific issues, and ask the client the meaning of unfamiliar (trade) 
terms.  Questioning the client’s understanding of the meaning of certain contract 
terms, based on business custom or trade usage, and the like can be an important 
source of information (especially if you are new to the profession). Another best 
practice is to compare forms; don’t rely on a single form.  If it is an internal, firm-
developed form, you should compare earlier versions with later versions to 
determine how the previous transactions are different from the current transaction.  
Always consider the source (Wikipedia is not a great source!). Finally, Farnsworth on 
Contracts, along with more transaction specific treatises, are excellent sources for 
determining the legal issues involved in drafting and enforcing particular contract 
clauses.19  Farnsworth provides clear and concise analysis of most areas of contract 
law.  Now clearly, it is a national treatise, so it may not be as useful from a state-
specific point of view.  But, I find a good general treatise like Farnsworth a very 
practical aid in drafting. 
D.  Reasonable Person Theory of Drafting 
 The best approach to contract writing is to apply a reasonable person theory 
of drafting.20  This is not a novel approach.  But, it is important to recognize that just 
because your client may have superior bargaining power, an attorney advantage (such 
as a big firm versus a small firm attorney who just does not have the resources and 
time to give to a lengthy negotiation, contract drafting, and review), that does not 
mean the drafting attorney should take advantage and write a heavily one-sided 
contract.  The drafter should write a contract that provides for his client’s concerns, 
but also one that is deal-preserving and with the judge in mind.21  This is especially 
true for clauses disfavored by the courts.   
                                                            
19 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS (3d ed. 2008). 
20 See generally Larry A. DiMatteo, The Counterpoise of Contracts:  The Reasonable Person Standard and the 
Subjectivity of Judgment 48 S.C. L. REV. 293 (1997) (exploring the roots of the reasonable person standard 
and how it has been fabricated). 
21 See IAN MACNEIL, THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT:  AN INQUIRY INTO MODERN CONTRACTUAL 
RELATIONSHIPS (1980). 
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 The drafting of a contract that withstands the application of the reasonable 
person standard applied by the courts will ultimately be in your client’s best interest.  
For there to be a role for the business lawyer in balancing the self-interest of their 
clients (narrow view of lawyer’s role) with the mutual interests of both parties 
(broader view of the lawyer’s role as expanding the pie to be divided), the lawyer 
should be involved at the earlier stages of negotiations.22  Ronald Gilson argues that 
lawyers should engage in joint solving problems to increase the size of the pie to be 
received by each party to the transaction.23  The contract can be both pro-client and 
pro-contract relationship at the same time.  The contract creates contract rights that 
are enforceable in court, but its main purpose is as a planning device where the 
contracting parties’ interests are aligned.  Ian Macneil succinctly stated that:  “In 
transactions no sensible line can be drawn between bindingness of planning and 
bindingness of obligation.  Transactional obligation is founded on specific planning, 
and therefore, to the extent that planning is binding, so is the obligation.”24  In sum, 
a contract drafted by the reasonable person encourages performance, not breach. As 
a planning device the goal is to prevent the enforcement of contract rights through 
litigation.  
III.  DEVELOPING A DRAFTING CHECKLIST:  COVENANTS NOT-TO-COMPETE 
As stated earlier, the development of checklists is an important safeguard in 
the drafting of specific contract clauses. I will use the covenant not-to-compete as an 
example. The main point to understand in such clauses or agreements is that there is 
no general law of covenants not-to-compete.  Each state has variations, some of 
them quite unique.  Some states attack such covenants with a default rule of voiding 
the covenant, subject to listed exceptions for the protection of trade secrets, goodwill 
in the sale of a business or the confidentiality of specialized training.25  One state 
voids all covenants not-to-compete as illegal.26  Most states have adopted a rule of 
reason approach.  Under the rule of reason approach, there is no one-size-fits-all 
covenant not-to-compete.  The drafter must be guided by the applicable statutes and 
case law of a given state.  And the penalties for getting it wrong can be severe.  The 
                                                            
22 Jonathan C. Lipson, Doing Deals in School, BUS. L. TODAY, Sept./Oct. 2005, at 51.  “[M]ost good 
business lawyers routinely:  help plan the deal, investigate the facts and the law as the deal develops, 
help negotiate, and draft the paperwork.”  Id. at  53. 
23 Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers:  Legal Skills and Asset Pricing, 94 YALE L.J. 239 
(1984). 
24  Ian Macneil, The Many Futures of Contracts, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 691, 776 (1994). 
25 See, e.g., GEORGIA STATUTES § 13-8-2.1. 
26 CAL. BUS & PROF CODE § 16600. 
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State of Georgia, for example, is one of the few states that does not allow for blue 
penciling (reforming) of covenants not-to-compete.  Most states would use 
reformation to modify a covenant to make it reasonable in terms of time, scope, and 
geographic range, but not Georgia.  If a Georgia court finds that any part of a clause 
is unreasonable, then the law directs them to void it. This is an example where a 
reasonable person drafting approach would better serve the client.  An example of a 
generic checklist for drafting covenants not-to-compete would take the following 
factors into account: 
A.  The Law 
• See if there is a relevant state statute. 
• Check recent case law. 
• Review the reasonableness of the restrictions on scope, geography, and 
duration in relation to precedents. 
B.  Factual Considerations 
• Type of Employee:  Do different employees require different covenants? 
• Type of Industry, Business:  Is there an industry standard regarding such 
covenants? 
C.  Other Drafting Considerations 
• Does the covenant adequately describe the proprietary interests being 
protected by the covenant? 
• Is there a reasonable relationship between the proprietary interest being 
protected and the covenant’s restrictions? 
• Does the covenant treat differently different types of termination (non-
voluntary for cause; non-voluntary without cause; voluntary)?  Does the 
covenant or contract define “cause”?  Does the covenant provide separate 
remedies for the different types of termination? 
• Will the covenant be signed pre-employment, during duration of 
employment, or at termination of employment? 
• Is consideration being given for the signing of the covenant? 
• Are past benefits linked to the honoring of the covenant?  Are past benefits 
(such as bonuses, training costs) linked to a minimum length of employment? 
2009] TRANSACTIONAL SKILLS TRAINING:   
CONTRACT DRAFTING—BEYOND THE BASICS 
271
 
 
• Are future benefits linked to the honoring of the covenant (e.g., pension 
contributions, exercise of stock options)? 
• Are remedies, such as liquidated damages, provided for in the covenant? 
• Does the covenant or contract include anti-solicitation restrictions 
(customers and co-employees)?  Does the covenant or contract provide for 
strict employee confidentiality obligations?  Does the employer “treat” 
information as confidential?  Does the covenant distinguish between basic 
human capital development and specialized training? 
• How does the covenant relate to other terms of the contract, such as 
liquidated damages clause, merger clause, severability clause, termination 
clause, remedies clause, notice clause)? 
D.  Best Practices 
• Review employee-related materials and policies provided by the company. 
• Review covenants periodically.  Rewrite based on changes in the law and 
changes in an employee’s position within the company. 
• Is enforceability or deterrence (scare tactic) the primary purpose of the 
covenant?  If the former, then reasonable person theory should be used in its 
drafting.  If a goal is to prevent litigation (and to be relationship-preserving), 
then reasonable person drafting and procedural fairness (especially in the 
case of involuntary termination) principles should be utilized.  Provide clear 
notice provisions relating to the covenant! 
In the field of covenants not-to-compete (employment context) there are 
numerous state statutes that really tell you what you can do or what you can’t do in 
writing a covenant not—to-compete, and they vary drastically from state to state.  A 
sampling of state statutes is a way of educating the drafter on the nuances of the law 
of restrictive covenants. 
IV.  SAMPLING OF STATE STATUTES 
California:  Covenants are void ab initio. 
Every contract by which anyone is restrained from engaging in a lawful 
profession, trade, or business of any kind is to that extent void.  CAL. BUS & PROF 
CODE § 16600. 
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Drafting Point:  The drafter will have to focus his drafting on anti-solicitation 
and confidentiality provisions in the contract. 
Colorado 
Any covenant not-to-compete which restricts the right of any person to 
receive compensation shall be void, but this shall not apply to: (1) Any contract for 
the purchase and sale of a business or the assets of a business; (2) Any contract for 
the protection of trade secrets; (3) Any contractual provision providing for recovery 
of the expense of educating and training an employee who has served an employer 
for a period of less than two years; and (4) Executive and management personnel 
and officers and employees who constitute professional staff to executive and 
management personnel. 
Any covenant not-to-compete in an employment, partnership, or corporate 
agreement between physicians which restricts the right of a physician to practice 
medicine upon termination of such agreement, shall be void; except that all other 
provisions of such an agreement enforceable at law, including provisions which 
require the payment of damages in an amount that is reasonably related to the injury 
suffered by reason of termination of the agreement, shall be enforceable. Provisions 
which require the payment of damages upon termination of the agreement may 
include, but not be limited to, damages related to competition.  COLORADO REVISED 
STATUTES § 8-2-113. 
Drafting Points:  The Colorado statute differentiates between upper 
management and other employees.  It also differentiates physician employees and 
partners from other types of employees and partners.  The drafter should describe 
the type of employee as executive and management personnel.  The statute also 
allows for the protection of educating and training employees who leave after serving 
less than a two year tenure.  The drafter should describe any such training and 
education in the covenant or incorporate by reference to the training documents. 
Florida 
A court shall not enforce a restrictive covenant unless it is set forth in a 
writing signed by the person against whom enforcement is sought and the person 
seeking enforcement proves the existence of one or more legitimate business 
interests justifying the restrictive covenant. “Legitimate business interest” includes:  
(1) trade secrets; (2) valuable confidential business or professional information that 
otherwise does not qualify as trade secrets; (3) substantial relationships with specific 
prospective or existing customers, patients, or clients; (4) customer, patient, or client 
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goodwill associated (with the employment); and (5) extraordinary or specialized 
training. 
If a person seeking enforcement of the restrictive covenant establishes prima 
facie that the restraint is reasonably necessary, the person opposing enforcement has 
the burden of establishing that the contractually specified restraint is overbroad, 
overlong, or otherwise not reasonably necessary to protect the established legitimate 
business interest or interests.  
In determining the reasonableness in time of a post-term restrictive covenant 
not-to-compete predicated upon the protection of trade secrets, a court shall apply 
the following rebuttable presumptions:  (1) In the case of a restrictive covenant 
sought to be enforced against a former employee, agent, or independent contractor, 
a court shall presume reasonable in time any restraint 6 months or less in duration 
and shall presume unreasonable in time any restraint more than 2 years in duration; 
(2) In determining the enforceability of a restrictive covenant, a court shall not 
consider any individualized economic or other hardship that might be caused to the 
person against whom enforcement is sought; (3)  A court shall construe a restrictive 
covenant in favor of providing reasonable protection to all legitimate business 
interests established by the person seeking enforcement. A court shall not employ 
any rule of contract construction that requires the court to construe a restrictive 
covenant narrowly, against the restraint, or against the drafter of the contract; (4) A 
court shall enforce a restrictive covenant by any appropriate and effective remedy, 
including, but not limited to, temporary and permanent injunctions. The violation of 
an enforceable restrictive covenant creates a presumption of irreparable injury to the 
person seeking enforcement of a restrictive covenant. No temporary injunction shall 
be entered unless the person seeking enforcement of a restrictive covenant gives a 
proper bond, and the court shall not enforce any contractual provision waiving the 
requirement of an injunction bond or limiting the amount of such bond; and (5) In 
the absence of a contractual provision authorizing an award of attorney's fees and 
costs to the prevailing party, a court may award attorney's fees and costs to the 
prevailing party in any action seeking enforcement of, or challenging the 
enforceability of, a restrictive covenant. A court shall not enforce any contractual 
provision limiting the court's authority under this section.  FLORIDA ANNOTATED 
STATUTES § 542.335. 
Drafting Points:  There are numerous drafting points provided by the Florida 
statute including:  (1) Expressly link the covenant to a “legitimate business interest” 
by describing in detail the type of extraordinary or specialized training received by 
the employee; the “confidential business or professional information provided to the 
employee;” the “substantial relationships [the employee has developed] with specific 
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prospective or existing customers, patients, or clients; the trade secrets that the 
employee was given access; and the type of goodwill the employee was given or 
obtained in developing relationships with customers, patients, or clients.  (2) Draft 
within the duration time periods provided in the statute.  (3) Be sure to make use of 
the “rebuttable presumptions” provided for in the statute.  (4) Do not contractually 
limit in the covenant to avoid the statute’s bond requirements.  (5) Insert a provision 
for the collection of attorney’s fees directly into the covenant. 
Georgia 
Employee “means an executive employee, officer, manager, or key employee; 
research & development personnel or other persons or entities in possession of 
confidential information that is important to the business; any other person in 
possession of selective or specialized skills, learning, or abilities or customer contacts 
or customer information.” 
An employee may agree in writing for the benefit of an employer to refrain, 
for a stated period of time following termination, from soliciting or accepting, or 
attempting to solicit or accept, directly or by assisting others, any business from any 
of such business's customers, including actively sought prospective customers, with 
whom the employee had material contact during his employment for purposes of 
providing products or services that are competitive with those provided by the 
employer's business. No express reference to geographic area or the types of 
products or services considered to be competitive shall be required. A duration of 
two years or less shall be presumed to be reasonable. 
An employee may agree in writing for the benefit of an employer to refrain, 
for a stated period of time following termination, from recruiting or hiring, or 
attempting to recruit or hire, directly or by assisting others, any other employee of 
the employer or its affiliates. A duration of three years or less shall be presumed to 
be reasonable. 
Activities, products, or services shall be considered sufficiently described if a 
reference to the activities, products, or services is provided and qualified by the 
phrase “of the type conducted, authorized, offered, or provided within one year prior 
to termination,” or similar language. Further, the phrase “the areas where the 
(employee) is working at the time of (termination)” shall be considered sufficient as a 
description of areas if the person or entity bound by the restraint can reasonably 
determine the maximum reasonable scope of the restraint at the time of termination.  
GEORGIA STATUTES § 13-8-2.1. 
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Drafting Points:  Use the definition of employee provided in the statute and 
stay within the durational guidelines:  two years or less for anti-solicitation of 
customers and three years or less for anti-solicitation of employees.  Finally, describe 
the types of products, services, or activities associated with the employee’s job. 
New York 
No specific statutory law, except for a recently enacted law with a very 
narrow, targeted focus, that deals with covenants not-to-compete. 
Drafting Point:  A thorough search of the case law is required. 
KENNETH A. ADAMS* 
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY IN DRAFTING 
 I have a grand total of 15 minutes to talk about use of information 
technology in contract drafting, so I’m going to split the presentation into thirds:  
five minutes on general background, five minutes on a race through some 
technologies, and five minutes on what it might mean to you all and your students.  
A.  General Background 
 Listening to yesterday’s presentations, my initial reaction to hearing the 
discussion about incorporating doctrine and negotiation in transactional skills 
courses was, “Gee, my life is simpler,” because my focus is limited to the language of 
contracts—not what you say in a contract, but how you say it. So how does that 
focus manifest itself?  Well, I moonlight at the University of Pennsylvania Law 
School, where I teach their first-ever contract drafting course to a grand total of 20 
students a year.  But most of my time I spend roaming the land, giving public and in-
house seminars on contract drafting.  I also write:  I am the proud proprietor of the 
sole contact-drafting blog, and I have my book, A Manual of Style for Contract 
Drafting,27 the second edition of which will be coming out this summer.   
                                                            
* Kenneth A. Adams is the principal of AdamsDrafting.  He applies his expertise in four different 
ways. He consults with corporations on how to improve their contract drafting. He conducts public 
and in-house seminars. He teaches at the University of Pennsylvania Law School. And he has written 
extensively on contract drafting—his book "A Manual of Style for Contract Drafting" is a best-seller 
for the ABA. 
27 KENNETH A. ADAMS, A MANUAL OF STYLE FOR CONTRACT DRAFTING (2d ed. 2008). 
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 I’m unapologetic about my relatively narrow focus. I’ve found that if you 
have rigorous control over how you say whatever you want to say a contract, 
everything else becomes a whole lot easier.  By contrast, if you’re drafting on 
autopilot and regurgitating the language of precedent contracts, everything becomes 
a lot messier.  You’re going spend a lot more time, and therefore a lot more money, 
drafting contracts, negotiating and closing deals, and monitoring performance under 
a contract, and you are going to greatly increase the chances of there being some 
unfortunate blowup down the road due an ostensibly minor drafting glitch.  It’s as if 
you were trying to build some grand edifice with faulty construction materials. 
 Now, mainstream contract drafting is nothing if not a matter of drafting on 
autopilot and regurgitating language that has been around for years. That’s why I 
think that mainstream contract drafting is a dysfunctional mess. You can pretty much 
see that in any contract taken at random.  It doesn’t really matter how exalted the law 
firm that prepared it, or how substantial the company is that is behind it.  If you 
want to see an example of embarrassing mainstream contract drafting, I suggest you 
have a look at the merger agreement dated March 18, 2008, between Bear Stearns 
and JPMorgan. 
 So you have the choice between drafting on autopilot and a more rigorous 
approach. But contract drafting is an industrial-scale, precedent-driven team sport, so 
change is very hard to achieve. 
 At the heart of the issue of change is whether you are going to look at 
contract drafting as a craft or a commodity.  Often lawyers talk about personal 
drafting styles.  They suggest that over time junior associates will develop a personal 
drafting style, or they describe how someone else has a drafting style that is different 
from their own. 
 If you buy into the notion of drafting styles, you’re approaching contract 
drafting as a craft.  It’s as if you’re in your cottage turning out artisanal tables and 
chairs, and I’m in my cottage turning out rather different tables and chairs. That’s 
not so great for contract drafting. 
 I would like contract drafting to be a commodity.  I compare contract 
language to software code.  Contract language is limited and stylized, and it doesn’t 
have any voice.  It shouldn’t really be about explaining stuff, it shouldn’t be about 
persuading. Instead, it’s about regulating conduct.  So if you accomplish a given 
drafting goal one way and I accomplish it another way, the odds are that one of us is 
being less efficient than the other.  What I try to do is winnow through contract 
language and pick out the most effective usages.  Life would be simpler if we all used 
the same, most-efficient usages.  And once contract language is standardized, you 
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can treat the contract process as a commodity.  Instead of lawyers treating contract 
drafting as a cottage industry, they can adopt a production-line mentality. 
 In the legal profession no one ever made a change solely in the interest of 
quality—there has to be money behind it somewhere.  So for purposes of this 
discussion, it’s relevant that law departments are increasingly being asked to do more 
with shrinking budgets, increasing outside counsel costs, and increasing compliance 
demands.  And at the same time a series of nifty information-technology tools have 
become available, so that we not only have a climate conducive to commoditization, 
we also have the means to accomplish it.  Let’s look at some of those tools now. 
B.  Nifty Information Technology Tools 
In the materials you have my article from the journal Perspectives28 that 
discusses what I think the problems are with contract drafting, and you have my 
ACC Docket article,29 which discusses the technologies that we’re going to have a 
brief look at now. 
 Different technologies can be used to help make the process of drafting 
contracts more commoditized.  One that I found quiet interesting is called 
Wordsensa.  A few months ago a company approached me to ask how they might go 
about boiling down 45 different confidentiality agreements in order to produce a 
new template.  My first thought was that you should throw them all in the trash and 
start essentially from scratch, but instead I suggested that they could use Wordsensa, 
which is a technology that will take dozens, hundreds, thousands of documents, 
analyze them, and present in endlessly sophisticated tables an analysis of what the 
common elements are in those documents and what their differences are. So if 
you’re dealing with high-volume documentation, Wordsensa may be of interest. 
 But the technology of greatest interest to me involves document assembly, 
which is the process of automatically compiling contracts using pre-approved 
contract language. One document-assembly technology is QShift, by Ixio. It’s 
intended for companies that have a medium volume of contracts.  The idea is you 
load pre-approved contract language on a server, including optional clauses and 
annotations. In preparing a contract from that pre-approved language, the user 
                                                            
28 Kenneth A. Adams, Teaching Contract Drafting:  The Two Elephants in the Room, 14 Perspectives:  
Teaching Legal Research and Writing 92 (2006). 
29 Kenneth A. Adams & Brian C. Quinn, Transitional Your Contract Process from the Artistic to the Industrial, 
ACC Docket (Dec. 2007). 
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selects whichever clauses work best for that transaction, reads whatever annotations 
are necessary, and inputs any information required.  So instead of reinventing the 
wheel, the user is able to focus on strategy.  And the user is discouraged from 
monkeying with the pre-approved language. 
 If you deal with a high volume of contracts, you could use DealBuilder, 
which is a logic-driven document-assembly software.  It’s for any company that has 
templates that it uses hundreds or thousands of times a year.  The user—ideally it 
would be a business person, to reduce the burden on the legal function—answers an 
online questionnaire, specifies what the transaction is, what the product is, what the 
price is, what the territory is, who the customer is, provides any other required 
information and makes any other required selections, and then clicks “Done.”  If any 
elements of the completed questionnaire are out of the ordinary, a red flag is raised, 
the legal department is sent an email, and the draft is in limbo until the matter can be 
properly addressed.  On the other hand, if everything is okay, the system pulls 
together the specified contract language and you end up with a draft that you’ve 
prepared in a fraction of the time that it takes using traditional methods  
 As regards collaboration technologies, I’ve been impressed by Litera IDS. 
Often a given draft contract has to be reviewed by lots of different people, and the 
process of handling many sets of comments can get unwieldy. Litera IDS allows you 
to manage the process. 
 As for checking drafts, the best-known tool is Deal Proof, which is sold by 
West. When you are done with your draft, you can run it through Deal Proof, which 
will, among other things, compile lists of open points, flag inconsistencies in how 
you use strings of nouns or verbs, and spot problems in how you’ve used defined 
terms. 
 I just learned of a tool launched a few weeks ago, Lexicon, that like Deal 
Proof checks how defined terms are used in a contract, but for a fraction of the 
price. Whereas Deal Proof is a subscription-based product, Lexicon is available for a 
one-time license fee of $80. 
 Finally, something that’s not significant for drafting purposes but for closing 
a transaction—signature-automation solutions.  They’re becoming very popular.  
EchoSign is just one of a number of different flavors of such software. 
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C.  Impact on You and Your Students 
What does all this mean for you and your students?  These technologies 
aren’t anything that you can use in your class; they only make sense if you use them 
consistently to handle a lot of contracts. 
Actually, one technology you can use in your class is a numbering utility 
called the Numbering Assistant, by Paying Consulting Group. It makes it a lot easier 
to use Word’s styles function.  For any drafting goal, there is going to be one most 
efficient way of doing things.  I take that approach with layout—how you position 
blocks of text on a page, and how you enumerate them.  And it would make sense if 
all contracts produced by a given organization were to look the same.  That goes for 
contracts drafted by my students, too.  So after I devised my preferred enumeration 
scheme, I contacted Payne Consulting Group, who agreed to incorporate the two 
versions of my scheme as default options in the Numbering Assistant. So if you have 
the Numbering Assistant, it’s a simple matter to apply my numbering schemes to a 
contract. That’s why I have my students use it. 
 But back to the more general question of how use of information technology 
in contract drafting is relevant to your students. I don’t want to be mucking around 
with my car’s engine—instead, I just want to drive the car. Similarly, when it comes 
to drafting a new contract, I want to be able to focus on strategy and negotiation, 
rather than re-inventing the wheel. We now have the tools to allow us to do that, and 
economic pressures are increasingly moving things in that direction. For example, 
mid-market loan documentation is being created by banks using a document-
assembly tool called Laser Point.  And two document-assembly solutions are being 
used in the construction industry. 
 So everything points to the increased commoditization of contract drafting.  
What are the obstacles? Well, not the technology. And as regards price, that’s simply 
a matter of a straightforward cost-benefit analysis. The main obstacles are cultural—
given that contract drafting is so precedent-driven, effecting change requires 
overcoming considerable inertia. 
 Ultimately, it would make sense for law firms and companies to outsource 
much of their contract drafting. There’s nothing stopping a vendor from compiling a 
online library of document-assembly templates and making it available to law firms 
and companies on a subscription basis. If a user says, “I need a confidentiality 
agreement,” they can go online and created a customized draft by answering 
questions rather than rummaging around for precedent.  
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  So for purposes of your students, use of information-technology tools in 
contract drafting is simply a matter of consciousness raising—suggesting to your 
students that in the future their drafting will be more a matter of focusing on strategy 
and less a matter of re-inventing the wheel.  
J. LYN ENTRIKIN GOERING* 
 Just to be a member of this panel is rather intimidating for me. I have used 
both Kenneth Adams’s blog and his book as well as Scott Burnham’s book in my 
teaching.  I am still very much learning how to do this, as many of you are as well.  
So I feel like an interloper on the panel. 
  What I have to say can be compressed into a fairly short time frame.  I am 
really here to promote the teaching of pervasive ethics as you teach transactional 
drafting.  Tina Stark said it very well yesterday, and I would like to spin off on what 
she left us with:  It is important to incorporate ethics, to whatever extent that we can, 
in every aspect of the transactional law curriculum:  the cases, the fact patterns, all of 
it.  I think it’s really important for a variety of reasons and I will not go through a lot 
of the philosophy. 
 Many of your law schools, like Washburn, teach a free-standing course in 
ethics. That course is dictated by the ABA accreditation requirements, and it’s 
generally the way law schools comply with those requirements.  But there is a lot of 
literature supporting the benefits of pervasive teaching of ethics by incorporating it 
into all doctrinal courses and of course skills courses. I think that’s what Tina briefly 
promoted yesterday, and I want to give you some additional ideas on how to do 
more of that. 
 I am a legal writing professor.  I don’t know very much about transactional 
law and, as much as I admire people like Tina and those of you who have a 
corporate background and know how to put together mergers and acquisitions, I 
lack that background.  So I sort of got dragged into this kicking and screaming.   
                                                            
* J. Lyn Entrikin Goering is an Associate Professor of Law at Washburn University School of Law 
and until August 2008 was Director of Washburn’s Legal Analysis, Research and Writing Program.  
Before attending law school, Professor Goering was employed as a legislative fiscal analyst for the 
Kansas Legislature. During law school she was editor-in-chief of the Washburn Law Journal. She later 
worked as a research attorney for Justice Richard Holmes of the Kansas Supreme Court. Thereafter, 
she served as administrative assistant to Chief Justice Robert Miller and then to Chief Justice Holmes. 
She was a law clerk to federal district court Judge Dale Saffels before joining the Topeka law firm of 
Wright, Henson, Somers, Sebelius, Clark & Baker.  She was later an Assistant Kansas Attorney 
General in the Legal Opinions and Government Counsel Division and established a solo practice in 
before joining the Washburn Law School faculty in 2003. 
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I tend to work into my course things that I am familiar with, like legislation.  
I am hoping that that will be the next generation of drafting courses, as we are not 
even beginning to talk about that very much in the legal curriculum.  I think there is 
a lot of commonality to both contract and statutory drafting.  For example, binding 
legal language is common to both.  But as far as business background is concerned, I 
don’t have that.   
What I do believe though, is that students very much want these kinds of 
drafting courses.  We started offering a survey drafting course at Washburn about 
four years ago. It included some contract drafting, some objective legal writing, 
judicial opinion writing, and a little bit of legislative drafting.  We have yet to meet 
the demand for these courses and, although I don’t feel like an expert on teaching 
transactional drafting, I can tell you and reiterate for those who are just embarking 
on this that our students cannot get enough of it.  They know what they need, they 
know this is what they can market to employers, and they want more of it. 
 Starting next year, we are going to be offering both Writing for Law Practice, 
the survey course we started teaching four years ago, as well as Transactional 
Drafting each year.  We are a fairly small law school.  We have 150 entering students 
per class, and I think we may be able to begin to stem the tide this fall by offering 
each course at least once or twice a year.  But it’s not uncommon at all for us to have 
25 students on a waiting list to get into these courses, and the students literally storm 
into the Dean’s office asking for more.  So I do think it’s an indication of the future 
of legal education, and the need for more drafting courses is something that I am 
really glad we are all here to address.  I am here learning with you. 
 I want to just talk a little bit about why we should bother to teach ethics at all 
in our drafting courses.  There are so many different things that we need to be 
teaching in the contract drafting course, and you are hearing a lot about all the 
impressive ideas you can incorporate.  We need to bother because this is the best 
way to teach ethics; I strongly believe that. All of us have taken a free-standing 
professional responsibility course. Students hear about the Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct ad nauseam and all those war stories about—well, my students 
call them “bad lawyer cases.”  It’s really not the best way to learn professional ethics 
because you are not incorporating those stories, those ethical issues into the very 
thing the students are more interested in learning.  That is why I think it is best to 
incorporate these stories and these ethical issues into teaching transactional drafting, 
and that is the best way to teach ethics—in context.  I have some ideas about how to 
do that.  I am going to give you some cutting-edge ideas that I think your students 
will enjoy hearing about.  They are articulated in more detail in the bibliography I’ve 
prepared for you.   
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So why do we need to do this? Because students want to know it and they 
get engaged when you talk to them about what kinds of issues they are going to 
come across in practice. I have only been teaching for five years.  I practiced for a 
long time and I was amazed that these issues came up literally almost every week.  In 
my practice, thorny ethical dilemmas often crossed my desk.  And the Model Rules 
don’t answer them; they answer them even less so in the transactional area because 
as some of you may know, the ethical rules are highly focused on litigation, much 
like our legal education curriculum.   
The model rules were not designed for the transactional drafting student and 
certainly not for the transactional drafting practitioner, and I think that gives us even 
more reason to incorporate ethical issues into transactional drafting courses because 
the answers are not in the Model Rules.  They are largely not addressed in the 
commentary either, and as a matter of fact, an argument can be made that the rules 
were actually a little bit more clear prior to the 1983 promulgation of the Model 
Rules than they are now.  Over time they have been become diluted, and that leaves 
a lot of judgment for our students to have to address how to handle these dilemmas 
in private practice. 
 So students want to know about ethical issues.  They get excited and 
engaged, and that’s what it’s about when we teach adult students.  Parenthetically, I 
have always thought it was a little odd that we call it “pedagogy”—derived from the 
Greek for “lead the child”—after all, none of our students are 16.  They are all at 
least of majority age.  I think the word “andragogy,” meaning the process of 
engaging adult learners in the structure of the learning experience, may be more 
correct.  If you read at all about the literature of andragogy, all the things that we 
have been talking about over these last two days are very pertinent if you get into the 
theory of andragogy as opposed to pedagogy.  It leads you to recognize our duty as 
legal educators to provide this kind of instruction in every course that we teach.  I 
think it’s a really wonderful message, and if you gather anything from my few 
minutes here, I would like you to remember how important it is for us as legal 
educators to warn our students of the things that they are going to come across in 
private practice. 
 Quickly, I am going to move ahead to some things that I think you can 
incorporate that I think your students will find interesting.  I am just going to hit on 
three.  The first one is metadata.  Most of us have heard about the e-discovery rules 
and the obligations we now have as litigating attorneys to retain and produce 
metadata when we are in discovery mode.  What you may not have thought about is 
that metadata is something that we incorporate all the time when we are 
electronically transmitting drafts of a contract from associate to associate within a 
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firm and to opposing counsel when you are negotiating a contract and transmitting 
things electronically to the other side.   
Now, metadata is the hidden data that’s buried in the files.  My students have 
to teach me how to find it, but they know how.  One right-clicks one’s 
mouse on the document and selects “properties” on a Windows computer.  
When doing so, you can find out who authored the document and when they 
last amended the document, for example.  That’s one kind of metadata.   
 Beyond that, how many of you understand and have taught in your courses 
how to use Microsoft Word’s “track changes” feature when modifying a contract?  
Surprisingly, the students don’t understand how to use that drafting tool very well.  I 
was amazed when I taught transactional drafting that maybe one or two students in 
the class understood how to use track changes and all these other interesting and 
really efficient tools that one can use to modify, edit, and draft documents, even 
compare and merge documents.  These are simple techniques, and we are not even 
to the level of Google Docs.  I am not even there yet.  But—these techniques that 
you can use with electronic technology to draft contracts—once you convert the 
document to final form, all that metadata stays in there.  So think about the potential 
minefield of information if you happen to transmit that document as an attachment 
to the other side, and they go in and find out that there was a comment added to the 
draft contract, like perhaps, “Are you kidding?  Never in a million years are we going 
to agree to that!”  Or, “You know our clients have given us this top-dollar figure, 
and we are not going above that.”  You have the risk of transmitting a lot of 
confidential data, and if you are not aware that it’s in there, you are risking a breach 
of client confidentiality. 
 Two major issues have come up involving metadata that I think are 
fascinating.  First of all, an ABA ethics opinion was recently issued suggesting that 
we as attorneys know all about metadata and that we know enough that it’s our 
ethical responsibility to “scrub” that metadata before transmitting that document to 
anybody.  Well, I didn’t know very much about this a month or so ago when I was 
preparing this talk, and I imagine many of you don’t know about it either.  But 
according to the ABA opinion, we have a presumed understanding of that 
information, that technology.  So think about it:  You now know you are in ethical 
trouble if you aren't aware of that, if you don’t have the scrubbing technology and 
you are not aware that when you transmit that information, it can potentially put you 
at risk of an ethical breach. 
 Now the more interesting issue, I think, and the more controversial one, is if 
you are on the receiving end of a document that includes confidential information 
284 TRANSACTIONS:  THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW 
 
  
buried and embedded in that metadata (which just means data about data, of course).  
In that situation, are you committed to mine it?  Do you have an obligation to your 
client to look inside to show the original with all the comments and amendments 
that you have received?  How many people think that’s permissible?  Is it permissible 
for you to mine that data?  How many people think it’s not permissible?  Who 
doesn’t know?  What’s going on here, and how do we resolve the dilemma? 
You can imagine how students might really get engaged in hearing about this.  
The truth is there is a split of authority.  The earlier opinions that came out of New 
York said it’s absolutely impermissible to mine the data from an electronic document 
you receive from the other side because what you are doing is undermining attorney-
client confidentiality by intruding into that confidential information and knowingly 
trying to get that data. 
 The earlier ethics opinions came out agreeing with New York, kind of like 
the old rule that some of you will remember:  What if you get a document that’s 
inadvertently transmitted to the wrong party?  Do you have an ethical obligation to 
send it back to alert the other side?  That’s kind of what the rule says:  What you 
have to do is alert the other side that you have it, and whether or not you have the 
ethical opportunity to read it depends upon the version of the ethical rules that apply 
in your jurisdiction. 
 The new opinions on using metadata are really split after the New York 
opinions came out and a couple of other states got on board saying it’s not 
permissible.  The ABA issued a formal ethical opinion in 2006 saying it’s perfectly 
permissible to mine the metadata for all it’s worth.  So since that time, at least the 
ABA’s opinion very much assumes that attorneys should know about scrubbing 
metadata and the obligation to do so.  If you send it without scrubbing the metadata, 
it’s mineable by the opponent, so be aware that there is a split of authority.   
More recently, a couple of jurisdictions, specifically Maryland and the District 
of Columbia, have followed the ABA opinion on that issue.  What we really have 
now is a split in the ethical opinions on the issue.  So, again, this is something I think 
your hi-tech students are going to relate to—this issue of what to do with metadata. 
 The next issue—and this something Larry DiMatteo mentioned briefly—
well, not briefly, at some length—what do you do with an unenforceable contract 
clause? Is it ethically permissible to draft a contract when you know that you are 
incorporating a clause that is, as a matter of law, unenforceable?  
 There are not necessarily any clear answers on that question either.  Over the 
last 25 years, the ethical rules have actually become more lenient on that point.  If 
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you go back and look at the original proposals in 1983, there was actually language 
proposing to ethically bar attorneys from knowingly incorporating unenforceable 
clauses into contracts.  Guess what?  In the final version of those rules that were 
promulgated in 1983, that proposed rule disappeared.  It is very interesting to talk to 
your students about what political pressures were brought to bear to cause the final 
draft to eliminate those kinds of obligations for transactional lawyers.  That, in and 
of itself, is an important thing to teach our students—the politics of ethical rules for 
attorneys.  There really aren’t clear rules on that issue, and of course these are the 
kinds of dilemmas that students are going to get into in private practice.  The rules 
permit them to knowingly include an unenforceable clause in an agreement, but does 
that mean they should?  Students have both a moral code as well as professional 
ethical code that they are going to have to use as a guide when dealing with these 
issues in private practice. 
 Finally, one of the most interesting issues that’s very recently come up is 
actually a wonderful segue from Ken Adams’s talk about outsourcing.  For economic 
reasons, outsourcing all kinds of legal services is growing by leaps and bounds.  
There are companies in India that major law firms are contracting with to provide 
legal support services.  It’s a multibillion-dollar industry.  Well, what are the ethical 
issues associated with that? Attached to the bibliography is a two-page brochure that 
I downloaded from the Internet a couple of days ago.  It shows you that these 
outsourcing companies are specifically marketing contract drafting services, so the 
people in India, who may be very well-qualified attorneys in India, are available for a 
small fee that equates to about an $8,000 annual salary to draft contracts.  That 
means what? Outsourcing contract drafting to firms in other countries is 
undermining the potential market for United States-trained lawyers that we are 
teaching to do this very work. 
 So this is something that has become a huge issue just in the last five years, 
given the obvious economic benefits for U.S. law firms.  The question is whether it is 
ethical for a law firm to outsource its contract-drafting work—and contract review 
work—to an India company, staffed by lawyers that are neither law trained in the 
United States nor licensed in the United States?  Ethical?  What do you think?  
New York came out with an ethical opinion saying, sure, you can do that as 
long as you meet certain conditions.  First, you have to avoid aiding a non-lawyer in 
an unauthorized legal practice.  So as long as you make sure you do that, it’s okay.  
Second, you must ensure competent representation. Of course, that’s obvious—a 
basic ethical rule—make sure that the outsourced representation is competent.  
Third, preserve client confidences. You have to make sure that the outsourcing 
company is avoiding conflicts of interest.  What if that multi-billion dollar firm over 
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there is representing the other side reviewing the contracts that your client has 
drafted?  You also have to make sure that you ensure appropriate billing, and finally, 
if necessary, obtain your client’s consent for outsourcing that work to a third party.  
 Now, as long as you meet all those conditions, a New York 2006 ethical 
opinion says it’s perfectly okay to outsource your work to a non-licensed attorney in 
India. I don’t know of any other ethical opinion that has come out on that very issue, 
but you can see that this is obviously an ethical minefield for the outsourcing law 
firm.  There are some interesting articles, largely written by student authors, that are 
cited in the bibliography on this issue and whether or not it’s ethical. I think this is 
the issue of the next decade:  how we are going to handle this, because the economic 
pressures are huge on law firms.   
 Just within this last month, a very interesting case was filed in the federal 
district court in the District of Columbia by a large law firm that some of you may 
have heard of:  MacIntosh and Hennessey.  The firm asked for a declaratory 
judgment and injunctive relief on this very issue:  whether or not it’s ethically 
permissible to send data overseas to India lawyers.  In particular, they included 
George W. Bush as a named defendant in that suit because the concern relates to the 
Fourth Amendment as the government had been monitoring Internet 
communications overseas.   
The issue is whether or not that’s an invasion that breaches client 
confidentiality.  But beyond that, the real underlying issue, if you read the pleadings, 
is whether the law firm has to get the client’s consent to outsource the work to an 
international law firm.  If so, the firm wants to know if it’s unfair competition 
essentially for opposing law firms to be sending their contract drafting and other 
kinds of litigation support services overseas when others can’t do that at a 
competitive economic cost.  These of course are very, very interesting issues.   
I hope you will think about incorporating some of these kinds of novel 
ethical questions in your transactional drafting classes.  Both you and your students 
will enjoy the discussions these issues trigger, and your students will learn a great deal 
about how to grapple with the ethical issues that so often arise in the context of 
transactional law practice. 
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SELECTED RESOURCES 
Teaching Ethics in Context:  Transactional Drafting 
Textbooks: 
Deborah L. Rhode, Professional Responsibility:  Ethics by the Pervasive Method Ch. 
XII, XIII (Aspen 2d ed. 1998) (hypotheticals involving contracts and corporate law). 
Marc I. Steinberg, Lawyering and Ethics for the Business Attorney 33-36, 91-93 
(West 2d ed. 2007) (hypotheticals involving drafting; client confidentiality and 
multiple representation dilemmas; appendix includes sample engagement letters, 
multiple representation letters, waiver of conflict letter, and joint defense agreement). 
E. Wendy Trachte-Huber & Stephen K. Huber, Mediation and Negotiation:  
Reaching Agreement in Law and Business (LexisNexis rev. 2d ed. 2007). 
Melissa H. Weresh, Legal Writing:  Ethical and Professional Considerations 
(LexisNexis 2006). 
Richard Zitrin, Carol M. Langford & Nina W. Tarr, Legal Ethics in the Practice of 
Law (LexisNexis 3d ed. 2007).  
ABA Reports: 
ABA Section of Legal Education and Admission to the Bar, Teaching and Learning 
Professionalism:  Report of the Professionalism Committee (1996) (suggesting more pervasive 
strategies for teaching professional responsibility). 
Articles: 
Laura Appleman, Teaching Legal Ethics:  A Beginner’s Perspective, 
http://legalethicsforum.typepad.com/blog/2006/03/index.html (March 23, 2006) 
(discussing pros and cons of various strategies for teaching professional 
responsibility). 
Jack T. Camp, Thoughts on Professionalism in the Twenty-First Century, 81 Tulane L. Rev.  
1377, 1393-1396 (2007) (urging law schools to integrate ethics and professionalism in 
substantive courses as well as specialized ethics courses; noting that no law school 
has yet adopted such an integrated curriculum). 
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Mary C. Daly and Bruce A. Green, Teaching Legal Ethics In Context, 70 N.Y. State Bar 
J. 6 (May/June 1998). 
Mary C. Daly, Bruce A. Green & Russell G. Pearce, Contextualizing Professional 
Responsibility:  A New Curriculum for a New Century, 58 Law & Contemp. Probs. 193 
(1995) (describing Fordham Law School’s contextual approach to teaching ethics, “a 
studied examination of ethical dilemmas in a single practice area,” as a supplement to 
the traditional survey course).   
Bruce A. Green, Less is More:  Teaching Legal Ethics in Context, 39 William & Mary L. 
Rev. 357 (1998). 
Charles C. Lewis, The Contract Drafting Process:  Integrating Contract Drafting in a  
Simulated Law Practice, 11 Clinical L. Rev. 241, 261 (2005) (“Any contract drafting 
course should include an ethical component . . . . Although the students may know 
the ethical rules, they sometimes have a hard time seeing an ethical issue when it 
actually confronts them.”). 
Therese Maynard, Teaching Professionalism:  The Lawyer as a Professional, 34 Ga. L. Rev. 
895, 925 (2000) (“[W]e do a real disservice to students if we fail to give explicit 
instruction and guidance on . . . values of professionalism as part of each and every 
course of the law school curriculum . . . .”). 
Russell G. Pearce, Legal Ethics Must Be the Heart of the Law School Curriculum, 26 J. Legal 
Educ. 159 (2002) (urging adoption of a pervasive ethics curriculum, which teaches 
how identify and analyze ethical questions in practice settings in which ethics is not 
the primary focus). 
Deborah L. Rhode, Ethics by the Pervasive Method, 42 J. Legal Educ. 31 (1992).  
Deborah L. Rhode, Into the Valley of Ethics:  Professional Responsibility and Educational 
Reform, 58 Law & Contemp. Probs. 139 (1995) (making the case for Stanford Law 
School’s pervasive approach to teaching legal ethics). 
Deborah L. Rhode, Teaching Legal Ethics, 51 St. Louis U. L.J. 1043, 1051-1057 (2007) 
(describing alternative teaching strategies) (“In an ideal world, the topic [of 
professional responsibility] would be integrated throughout the core curriculum and 
given focused attention in a range of upper-level courses, particularly clinics.”). 
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Tina L. Stark, Ethics of Drafting Agreements, Sixth Annual Municipal Law Institute, 205 
PLI/Crim. 127 (2006) (discussing three hypotheticals involving ethical issues in 
contract drafting) (available on Westlaw). 
Celia R. Taylor, Teaching Ethics in Context:  Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon in the First 
Year Curriculum, 28 Pace L. Rev. 249 (2008). 
Margaret Graham Tebo, A Treacherous Path:  Ethics Rules May Seem Clear, But in the 
Changing World of Commerce They Can Become Murky, 86 A.B.A. J. 54 (Feb. 2000).  
Metadata 
ABA Standing Committee on Professional Responsibility, Formal Opinion No. 06-
442, Review and Use of Metadata (Aug. 5, 2006), available at 
http://www.delawarelitigation.com/ABAethicsOpMetadata.pdf (interpreting Model 
Rule 4.4(b) as revised in 2002, which does not preclude a receiving attorney from 
mining metadata received from opposing counsel).  
Alabama Bar Ethics Opinion No. 2007-02 (concluding that an attorney acts 
unethically by mining metadata from an electronic document received from another 
party). 
Cal. State Bar Standing Comm. on Prof. Resp. & Conduct, Formal Op. No. 2007-
174 (opining that attorney, who had been retained to negotiate and execute royalty 
agreement entrusting client’s secret invention to corporation for commercial 
development, was ethically obligated to release electronic drafts of transactional 
document to client’s newly retained attorney, and to strip any metadata reflecting 
confidential information belonging to other clients). 
D.C. Bar Ethics Comm., Legal Ethics Op. 341 (2007) (concluding that receiving 
lawyer may review metadata in electronic file received from opponent absent prior 
knowledge that metadata was sent inadvertently). 
Florida Bar Ethics Op. No. 06-02 (September 15, 2006) (concluding that a lawyer 
who receives electronic document should not try to obtain information from 
metadata that lawyer knows or should know is not intended for receiving lawyer, and 
should notify sender of inadvertently received information via metadata in electronic 
document).  
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Maryland State Bar Ass’n, Inc., Comm. on Ethics, Ethics Docket No. 2007-09 
(concluding that recipient attorney, subject to legal standards or requirements, does 
not violate ethical obligations by reviewing or making use of metadata without first 
determining whether sender intended to include the information; and sending 
attorney has an ethical obligation to take reasonable measures to avoid disclosure of 
confidential information or work product materials embedded in electronic 
discovery). 
New York City Law Ass’n Comm. on Prof. Ethics, Op. No. 738 (March 24, 2008) 
(concluding that a lawyer who receives electronic documents from adversary that 
contain inadvertently produced metadata is ethically obligated to refrain from 
searching it, and may not take advantage of opponent’s breach of ethical duty to 
scrub documents of metadata before sending). 
New York State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof. Ethics, Op. No. 782 (2004) (concluding 
that a lawyer has an ethical duty to monitor against improper disclosure of metadata).  
New York State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof. Ethics, Op. No. 749 (2003) (using 
computer technology to access client confidences and secrets revealed in metadata 
amounts to impermissible intrusion into attorney-client relationship). 
David Hricik, Mining for Embedded Data:  Is It Ethical to Take Intentional Advantage of 
Other People’s Failures?, 8 N.C. J. L. & Tech. 231 (2007) (criticizing ABA Formal Op. 
No. 06-442 as wrongly assuming that everyone knows about embedded data in 
electronic documents).   
David Hricik & Chase Edward Scott, Metadata:  The Ghosts Haunting e-Documents, 13 
Ga. B. J. 16 (No. 5, Feb. 2008) (describing metadata in drafted documents and 
providing detailed instructions on alternatives for removing metadata), (available at 
http://www.gabar.org/communications/georgia_bar_journal/, select “archives”) (last 
visited May 20, 2008). 
David Hricik & Chase Edward Scott, Metadata:  Ethical Obligations of the Witting and 
Unwitting Recipient, 13 Ga. B. J. 30 (No. 6, April 2008) (available at 
http://www.gabar.org/communications/georgia_bar_journal/, select “current issue”) 
(reviewing conflicting ethical opinions in various jurisdictions concerning ethical 
obligations of attorneys who receive electronic documents with embedded 
metadata). 
Boris Reznikov, To Mine or Not to Mine:  Recent Developments in the Legal Ethics Debate 
Regarding Metadata, 4 Shidler J. L. Com. & Tech. 13 (2008), available at 
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http://www.lctjournal.washington.edu/Vol4/a13Reznikov.html (summarizing 
conflicting views about whether attorneys may ethically mine data outside discovery 
context). 
Drafting Unenforceable or Unconscionable Clauses 
Paul D. Carrington, Unconscionable Lawyers, 19 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 361 (2002) (noting 
with dismay that ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct do not explicitly 
authorize professional discipline for lawyers who draft unconscionable contract 
provisions).  
Christina L. Kunz, The Ethics of Invalid and “Iffy” Contract Clauses, 40 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 
487 (2006). 
Deborah L. Rhode, Professional Responsibility:  Ethics by the Pervasive Method 
532-536 (Aspen 2d ed. 1998) (discussing ethical considerations of drafting 
unenforceable contract clauses). 
William T. Vukowich, Lawyers and the Standard Form Contract System:  A Model Rule That 
Should Have Been, 6 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 799 (1993) (arguing that ABA Model Rules 
should prohibit drafting contracts that include unenforceable or unconscionable 
terms). 
Misrepresentation in Settlement Negotiations 
Nathan M. Crystal, The Lawyer’s Duty to Disclose Material Facts in Contract or Settlement 
Negotiations, 87 Ky. L. J. 1055 (1999) (arguing that a lawyer acts unethically by failing 
to disclose material information when nondisclosure amounts to misrepresentation 
or violates discovery rules or other law). 
Ausherman v. Bank of America Corporation, 212 F. Supp. 2d 435, 445-452 (D. Md. 2002) 
(discussing duty of candor and truthfulness in Model Rule of Professional Conduct 
4.1; rejecting counsel’s argument that alleged misrepresentation during settlement 
negotiations was merely “settlement bluster”). 
Scrivener’s Errors and Alterations 
ABA Informal Opinion 85-1518 (1986) (when parties to a contract agree on a 
particular business issue but drafter whose client the agreed provision favors 
inadvertently omits the negotiated term from the draft contract, the lawyer for the 
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other party has an ethical duty to point out the mistake and need not advise his client 
before doing so). 
Becker v. Port Dock Four, Inc.,752 P.2d 1235 (Ore. Ct. App. 1988) (legal malpractice 
action for failing to include negotiated conditions in a deed conveying real property, 
as required by land sales contract drafted by defendant; plaintiff’s comparative 
negligence for failing to read deed before signing was properly submitted to jury).  
Hennig v. Ahearn, 601 N.W.2d 149 (Wis. App. 1999), pet. for rev. denied (Oct. 26, 1999) 
(jury question whether corporation’s president intentionally misrepresented crucial 
term of executive compensation agreement by remaining silent about last-minute 
change, after all other contract changes had been clearly highlighted during earlier 
negotiation phases). 
Wright v. Pennamped, 657 N.E.2d 1223 (Ind. App. 1995) (drafting attorney assumes an 
ethical duty to disclose any changes in loan agreement to other parties prior to 
execution). 
Multiple Representation 
In re Key, 582 S.E.2d 400 (S.C. 2003) (public reprimand against respondent for 
misconduct in representing both buyer and seller of commercial real property 
negotiated by the parties themselves; counsel conceded conflict of interest and 
failure to obtain informed waivers from clients). 
Texas Professional Ethics Opinion 176 (May 1958) (attorney who represented both 
corporation and its general superintendent in drafting pre-negotiated employment 
contract could not ethically represent superintendent in wrongful discharge action), 
available at http://www.txethics.org/ (last visited May 20, 2008). 
Conflicts of Interest 
McMahon v. Eke-Nweke, 503 F. Supp. 2d 598 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (denying attorney’s 
motion for summary judgment in client’s action alleging breach of fiduciary duty by 
entering into unconscionable apartment lease with client). 
Jones v. Rabanco, Ltd., 2006 WL 2237708 (W.D. Wash. 2006) (disqualifying plaintiff’s 
counsel for conflict of interest based upon the firm’s former representation of 
defendant’s wholly owned subsidiary in prior contract dispute with third party). 
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Outsourcing Legal Work 
Mary C. Daly & Carole Silver, Flattening the World of Legal Services? The Ethical and 
Liability Minefields of Offshoring Legal and Law-Related Services, 38 Georgetown J. of Int’l 
Law 401 (2007). 
Arin Greenwood, Manhattan Work at Mumbai Prices, ABA Journal (October 2007).  
Alison M. Kadzik, Student Author, The Current Trend to Outsource Legal Work Abroad 
and the Ethical Issues Related to Such Practices, 19 Georgetown J. of Legal Ethics 731 
(2006).  
Darya V. Pollak, Student Author, “I'm Calling My Lawyer . . . In India!”:  Ethical Issues In 
International Legal Outsourcing, 11 UCLA J. Int'l L. & Foreign Aff. 99 (2006).  
Mark Ross, Legal Process Outsourcing (LPO): 2007 and Beyond, Law Practice Today 
(ABA Law Practice Mgmt. Section Feb. 2008), available at 
http://www.abanet.org/lpm/lpt/articles/mgt02081.shtml 
Keith Woffinden, Student Author, Surfing the Next Wave of Outsourcing:  The Ethics of 
Sending Domestic Legal Work to Foreign Countries Under New York City Opinion 2006-3, 
2007 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 483 (2007).  
Ass’n of the Bar of the City of New York Comm. on Professional and Judicial 
Ethics, Formal Op. 2006-03 (Aug. 2006), available at 
http://www.abcny.org/Ethics/eth2006.htm (concluding that a N.Y. lawyer may 
ethically outsource legal support services overseas to non-lawyer under specified 
conditions that avoid aiding non-lawyer in unauthorized practice of law, ensure 
competent representation, preserve client confidences, avoid conflicts of interest, 
ensure appropriate billing, and when necessary, obtain client consent). 
Lexadigm, Inc., Practical and Ethical Considerations of Legal Outsourcing, presentation to 
Harry Phillips American Inn of Court, Univ. Club of Nashville (Feb. 20, 2007), 
available at http://www.lexadigm.com/docs/Practical and Ethical Considerations of 
Legal Outsourcing_Lexadigm.pdf 
Newman McIntosh & Hennessey, LLP v. Acumen Legal Services (India) Pvt., Ltd.,  No. 1:08-
cv-00787-CKK (D.D.C.) (filed May 12, 2008) (complaint for declaratory judgment 
and injunctive relief concerning electronic transmission of client data from U.S. law 
firm to overseas legal process outsourcer). 
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Naming Drafting Attorney as Fiduciary 
Paula A. Monopoli, Drafting Attorneys as Fiduciaries:  Fashioning an Optimal Ethical Rule 
for Conflicts of Interest, 66 U. Pittsburgh L. Rev. 411, 428 (2005), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=829126 (criticizing MRPC 1.8 and ABA Formal Op. 02-
426, when read together, as “ambiguity at best and contradiction at worst”). 
Model Rules of Prof. Conduct R. 1.8(c) cmt. 8 (“This rule does not prohibit a lawyer 
from seeking to have the lawyer or a partner or associate of the lawyer named as 
executor of the client’s estate or to another potentially lucrative position.”) 
ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Resp., Formal Op. 02-426 (addressing whether a 
drafting attorney may serve as fiduciary for client’s estate or trust). 
State Bar of Georgia, Formal Advisory Op. No. 91-1 (addressing ethical propriety of 
will drafter also serving as executor). 
Aiding Unauthorized Practice of Law 
Jeffrey M. Aresty & Peter D. Lepsch, Professional Responsibility in a Global World:  A 
Lawyer’s Role Redefined in the Age of the Virtual Practice, 8 New Eng. J. of Int’l & Comp. 
Law 37, 51-65 (2002) (ethical issues pertaining to online legal advice). 
Cynthia L. Fountaine, When is a Computer a Lawyer?:  Interactive Legal Software, 
Unauthorized Practice of Law, and the First Amendment, 71 U. Cin. L. Rev. 147 (2002). 
Unauthorized Practice of Law Comm. v. Parsons Tech., Inc., 1999 WL 47235 (N.D. Tex. 
Jan. 22, 1999) (holding that computerized document drafting with defendant’s 
Quicken Family Lawyer amounted to unauthorized practice of law by adapting 
content of online form to user’s responses), vacated and remanded, 179 F.3d 956 (5th 
Cir. 1999) (mooting case in light of amendment to Tex. Govt. Code § 81.101 
redefining “practice of law” to exclude computer software if the product clearly 
states it is not a substitute for attorney’s advice). 
Cleveland Bar Ass’n v. Sharp Estate Services, Inc., 837 N.E.2d 1183 (Ohio 2005) 
(enjoining respondent and other estate planning services from engaging in 
unauthorized practice of law). 
Disciplinary Council v. Wheatley, 837 N.E.2d 1188 (Ohio 2005) (disciplining attorney for 
facilitating non-attorneys in marketing estate plans and living trusts in a manner that 
engaged in unauthorized practice of law). 
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Neb. Ethics Advisory Op. for Lawyers No. 06-10 (opining that contractually and 
financially associating with non-lawyer estate planning business, which solicited 
clients and prepared mass-produced documents for execution by clients after 
attorney review, raised a host of potential ethical violations). 
